(Ebook) Solution Manual for Financial Accounting Theory 6th Edition by William R Scott ISBN 9780135119150 0135119154

(Ebook) Solution Manual for Financial Accounting Theory 6th Edition by William R Scott ISBN 9780135119150 0135119154

(Ebook) Solution Manual for Financial Accounting Theory 6th Edition by William R Scott - Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 9780135119150 ,0135119154
Full download (Ebook) Solution Manual for Financial Accounting Theory 6th Edition after payment

Product details:

ISBN 10: 0135119154
ISBN 13: 9780135119150
Author: William R Scott

(Ebook) Solution Manual for Financial Accounting Theory 6th Edition Table of contents:

1 Introduction

1.1 The Objective of This Book

1.2 Some Historical Perspective

1.3 The 2007–2008 Market Meltdowns

1.4 Efficient Contracting

1.5 A Note on Ethical Behaviour

1.6 Rules-Based Versus Principles-Based Accounting Standards

1.7 The Complexity of Information in Financial Accounting and Reporting

1.8 The Role of Accounting Research

1.9 The Importance of Information Asymmetry

1.10 The Fundamental Problem of Financial Accounting Theory

1.11 Regulation as a Reaction to the Fundamental Problem

1.12 The Organization of This Book

1.12.1 Ideal Conditions

1.12.2 Adverse Selection

1.12.3 Moral Hazard

1.12.4 Standard Setting

1.12.5 The Process of Standard Setting

1.13 Relevance of Financial Accounting Theory to Accounting Practice

2 Accounting Under Ideal Conditions

2.1 Overview

2.2 The Present Value Model Under Certainty

2.2.1 Summary

2.3 The Present Value Model Under Uncertainty

2.3.1 Summary

2.4 Examples of Present Value Accounting

2.4.1 Embedded Value

2.4.2 Reserve Recognition Accounting

2.4.3 Critique of RRA

2.4.4 Summary of RRA

2.5 Historical Cost Accounting Revisited

2.5.1 Comparison of Different Measurement Bases

2.5.2 Conclusion

2.6 The Non-existence of True Net Income

2.7 Conclusion to Accounting Under Ideal Conditions

3 The Decision-Usefulness Approach to Financial Reporting

3.1 Overview

3.2 The Decision-Usefulness Approach

3.2.1 Summary

3.3 Single-Person Decision Theory

3.3.1 Decision Theory Applied

3.3.2 The Information System

3.3.3 Information Defined

3.3.4 Summary

3.4 The Rational, Risk-Averse Investor

3.5 The Principle of Portfolio Diversification

3.6 Increasing the Decision-usefulness of Financial Reporting

3.6.1 Introduction

3.6.2 Objectives of Management Discussion and Analysis

3.6.3 An Example of MD&A Disclosure

3.6.4 Is MD&A Decision-useful?

3.6.5 Conclusion

3.7 The Reaction of Professional Accounting Bodies to the Decision-usefulness Approach

3.7.1 The Conceptual Framework

3.7.2 Summary

3.8 Conclusions on Decision Usefulness

4 Efficient Securities Markets

4.1 Overview

4.2 Efficient Securities Markets

4.2.1 The Meaning of Efficiency

4.2.2 How Do Market Prices Fully Reflect All Available Information?

4.2.3 Summary

4.3 Implications of Efficient Securities Markets for Financial Reporting

4.3.1 Implications

4.3.2 Summary

4.4 The Informativeness of Price

4.4.1 A Logical Inconsistency

4.4.2 Summary

4.5 A Model of Cost of Capital

4.5.1 A Capital Asset Pricing Model

4.5.2 Critique of the Capital Asset Pricing Model

4.5.3 Summary

4.6 Information Asymmetry

4.6.1 A Closer Look at Information Asymmetry

4.6.2 Fundamental Value

4.6.3 Summary

4.7 The Social Significance of Securities Markets that Work Well

4.8 Conclusions on Efficient Securities Markets

5 The Value Relevance of Accounting Information

5.1 Overview

5.2 Outline of the Research Problem

5.2.1 Reasons for Market Response

5.2.2 Finding the Market Response

5.2.3 Separating Market-wide and Firm-specific Factors

5.2.4 Comparing Returns and Income

5.3 The Ball and Brown Study

5.3.1 Methodology and Findings

5.3.2 Causation Versus Association

5.3.3 Outcomes of the BB Study

5.4 Earnings Response Coefficients

5.4.1 Reasons for Differential Market Response

5.4.2 Implications of ERC Research

5.4.3 Measuring Investors’ Earnings Expectations

5.4.4 Summary

5.5 A Caveat about the “Best” Accounting Policy

5.6 The Value Relevance of Other Financial Statement Information

5.7 Conclusions on Value Relevance

6 The Valuation Approach to Decision Usefulness

6.1 Overview

6.2 Behavioural Finance Versus Market Efficiency and Investor Rationality

6.2.1 Introduction to Behavioural Finance

6.2.2 Prospect Theory

6.2.3 Validity of Beta as the Sole Risk Measure

6.2.4 Excess Stock Market Volatility

6.2.5 Stock Market Bubbles

6.2.6 Summary

6.3 Efficient Securities Market Anomalies

6.4 Limits to Arbitrage

6.5 A Defence of Average Investor Rationality

6.5.1 Dropping Rational Expectations

6.5.2 Dropping Common Knowledge

6.6 Summary of Challenges to Securities Market Efficiency

6.7 Conclusions About Securities Market Efficiency and Investor Rationality

6.8 The Low Value-relevance of Financial Statement Information

6.9 Ohlson’s Clean Surplus Theory

6.9.1 Three Formulae for Firm Value

6.9.2 Earnings Persistence

6.9.3 Estimating Firm Value

6.9.4 Empirical Studies of the Residual Income Model

6.9.5 Summary

6.10 Auditors’ Legal Liability

6.11 Demand for Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism

6.12 Conclusions on the Valuation Approach to Decision Usefulness

7 Valuation Applications

7.1 Overview

7.2 Current Value Accounting

7.2.1 Two Versions of Current Value Accounting

7.2.2 Current Value Accounting and the Income Statement

7.2.3 Summary

7.3 Longstanding Valuation Examples

7.3.1 Accounts Receivable and Payable

7.3.2 Cash Flows Fixed by Contract

7.3.3 The Lower-of-Cost-or-Market Rule

7.3.4 Revaluation Option for Property, Plant, and Equipment

7.3.5 Impairment Test for Property, Plant, and Equipment

7.3.6 Summary

7.4 Financial Instruments Defined

7.5 Primary Financial Instruments

7.5.1 Standard Setters Back Down Somewhat on Fair Value Accounting

7.5.2 Longer-run Changes to Fair Value Accounting

7.5.3 The Fair Value Option

7.5.4 Loan Loss Provisioning

7.5.5 Summary and Conclusions

7.6 Fair Value Versus Historical Cost

7.7 Liquidity Risk and Financial Reporting Quality

7.8 Derecognition and Consolidation

7.9 Derivative Financial Instruments

7.9.1 Characteristics of Derivatives

7.9.2 Hedge Accounting

7.10 Conclusions on Accounting for Financial Instruments

7.11 Accounting for Intangibles

7.11.1 Introduction

7.11.2 Accounting for Purchased Goodwill

7.11.3 Self-developed Goodwill

7.11.4 The Residual Income Model Revisited

7.11.5 Summary

7.12 Reporting on Risk

7.12.1 Beta Risk

7.12.2 Why Do Investors Care about Firm-specific Risk?

7.12.3 Stock Market Reaction to Other Risks

7.12.4 A Valuation Approach to Risk Reporting

7.12.5 Summary

7.13 Conclusions on Valuation Applications

8 Efficient Contracting Theory and Accounting

8.1 Overview

8.2 Efficient Contracting Theory and Accounting

8.3 Sources of Efficient Contracting Demand for Financial Accounting Information

8.3.1 Lenders

8.3.2 Shareholders

8.4 Accounting Policies for Efficient Contracting

8.4.1 Reliability

8.4.2 Conservatism

8.5 Contract Rigidity

8.6 Employee Stock Options

8.7 Discussion and Summary of ESO Expensing

8.8 Distinguishing Efficiency and Opportunism in Contracting

8.9 Summary of Efficient Contracting for Debt and Stewardship

8.10 Implicit Contracts

8.10.1 Definition and Empirical Evidence

8.10.2 A Single-period Non-cooperative Game

8.10.3 A Trust-Based Multi-period Game

8.10.4 Summary of Implicit Contracting

8.11 Summary of Efficient Contracting

9 An Analysis of Conflict

9.1 Overview

9.2 Agency Theory

9.2.1 Introduction

9.2.2 Agency Contracts Between Firm Owner and Manager

9.3 Manager’s Information Advantage

9.3.1 Earnings Management

9.3.2 The Revelation Principle

9.3.3 Controlling Earnings Management

9.3.4 Agency Theory with Psychological Norms

9.4 Discussion and Summary

9.5 Protecting Lenders from Manager Information Advantage

9.6 Implications of Agency Theory for Accounting

9.6.1 Are Two Better Than One?

9.6.2 Rigidity of Contracts

9.7 Reconciliation of Efficient Securities Market Theory with Economic Consequences

9.8 Conclusions on the Analysis of Conflict

10 Executive Compensation

10.1 Overview

10.2 Are Incentive Contracts Necessary?

10.3 A Managerial Compensation Plan

10.4 The Theory of Executive Compensation

10.4.1 The Relative Proportions of Net Income and Share Price in Evaluating Manager Performance

10.4.2 Short-run Effort and Long-run Effort

10.4.3 The Role of Risk in Executive Compensation

10.5 Empirical Compensation Research

10.6 The Politics of Executive Compensation

10.7 The Power Theory of Executive Compensation

10.8 The Social Significance of Managerial Labour Markets that Work Well

10.9 Conclusions on Executive Compensation

11 Earnings Management

11.1 Overview

11.2 Patterns of Earnings Management

11.3 Evidence of Earnings Management for Bonus Purposes

11.4 Other Motivations for Earnings Management

11.4.1 Other Contracting Motivations

11.4.2 Meeting Investors’ Earnings Expectations

11.4.3 Stock Offerings

11.4.4 To Hide Behind Error “Camouflage”

11.5 The Good Side of Earnings Management

11.5.1 Blocked Communication

11.5.2 Empirical Evidence of Good Earnings Management

11.6 The Bad Side of Earnings Management

11.6.1 Opportunistic Earnings Management

11.6.2 Empirical Evidence of Bad Earnings Management

11.6.3 Do Managers Accept Securities Market Efficiency?

11.6.4 Analyzing Managers’ Speech to Detect Bad Earnings Management

11.6.5 Management Choices Among Earnings Management Methods

11.6.6 Implications for Accountants

11.7 Conclusions on Earnings Management

12 Standard Setting: Economic Issues

12.1 Overview

12.2 Regulation of Economic Activity

12.3 Ways to Characterize Information Production

12.4 First-Best Information Production

12.5 Market Failures in the Production of Information

12.5.1 Externalities and Free-Riding

12.5.2 The Adverse Selection Problem

12.5.3 The Moral Hazard Problem

12.5.4 Unanimity

12.6 Contractual Incentives for Information Production

12.6.1 Examples of Contractual Incentives

12.6.2 The Coase Theorem

12.7 Market-Based Incentives for Information Production

12.8 A Closer Look at Market-Based Incentives

12.8.1 The Disclosure Principle

12.8.2 Signalling

12.8.3 Private Information Search

12.9 Are Firms Rewarded for Superior Disclosure?

12.9.1 Theory

12.9.2 Empirical Tests of Reporting Quality

12.9.3 Is Estimation Risk Diversifiable?

12.10 Decentralized Regulation

12.11 How Much Information Is Enough?

12.12 Conclusions on Standard Setting Related to Economic Issues

13 Standard Setting: Political Issues

13.1 Overview

13.2 Two Theories of Regulation

13.2.1 The Public Interest Theory

13.2.2 The Interest Group Theory

13.2.3 Which Theory of Regulation Applies to Standard setting?

13.3 Conflict and Compromise: an Example of Constituency Conflict

13.4 Distribution of the Benefits of Information, Regulation FD

13.5 Criteria for Standard Setting

13.5.1 Decision Usefulness

13.5.2 Reduction of Information Asymmetry

13.5.3 Economic Consequences of New Standards

13.5.4 Consensus

13.5.5 Summary

13.6 The Regulator’s Information Asymmetry

13.7 International Integration of Capital Markets

13.7.1 Convergence of Accounting Standards

13.7.2 Effects of Customs and Institutions on Financial Reporting

13.7.3 The Role of Auditing in Protecting Small Investors in Developing Economies

13.7.4 Does Adopting High Quality Accounting Standards Improve Financial Reporting Quality?

13.7.5 Does Adopting High Quality Accounting Standards Improve Financial Statement Comparability?

13.7.6 Effects of IFRS Adoption on Contract Efficiency

13.7.7 Conclusion on the Benefits of IFRS Adoption

13.8 Should the United States Adopt IASB Standards?

13.9 Summary of Accounting for International Capital Markets Integration

13.10 Conclusions and Summing Up

Bibliography

People also search for (Ebook) Solution Manual for Financial Accounting Theory 6th Edition:

    
the fundamental problem of financial accounting theory
    
waec financial accounting theory questions and answers pdf
    
accounting and theory
    
financial accounting theory an accounting quality approach
    
financial accounting theory and accounting quality approach pdf

Tags: William R Scott, Solution Manual, Financial Accounting