(Ebook) Informal Coalitions and Policymaking in Latin America Ecuador in Comparative Perspective 1st Edition by Andrés Mejía Acosta ISBN 9780415993548 0415993547

(Ebook) Informal Coalitions and Policymaking in Latin America Ecuador in Comparative Perspective 1st Edition by Andrés Mejía Acosta ISBN 9780415993548 0415993547

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Product details:

ISBN 10: 0415993547
ISBN 13: 9780415993548
Author: Andrés Mejía Acosta

(Ebook) Informal Coalitions and Policymaking in Latin America Ecuador in Comparative Perspective 1st Edition Table of contents:

1 Pushing Reforms Through the Eye of a Needle

THE PUZZLE: MUDDLING THROUGH REFORMS

Policymaking in a Fragmented Environment

MAKING COALITIONS FOR REFORM: EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

Agent-Based Explanations

Crisis-Based Explanations

Institutional Explanations

COALITION-MAKING IN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS

The Puzzle of Coalition Formation in Ecuador

The Making of Ghost Coalitions

Ghost Coalitions as an Informal Institution

Ghost Coalitions and the 1998 Constitutional Reforms

ECONOMIC REFORMS, GHOST COALITIONS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

BOOK OVERVIEW

2 A Proposed Model for Legislative Cooperation

EXPLAINING POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY GRIDLOCK

INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR POLICY CHANGE

What do Legislators Want?

Policymaking Incentives

Institutional or Office-Seeking Incentives

Distributional or Rent-Seeking Incentives

Vote-Seeking Incentives

What do Presidents Want?

Gathering Legislative Majorities

Reducing the Cost of Legislative Support

BUILDING COALITIONS IN FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACIES

Crafting Optimal Payoffs

The Decision of a Pivotal Legislator

The Party Leader’s Decision

The President’s Decision

Party Leaders as Coalition Brokers

Reducing Coalition Liability

GHOST COALITIONS

The Gray Dimensions of Coalition-Making

Testing Model Implications

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

3 Presidential Success in a Fragmented Legislature

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS AND POLICY CHANGE

Assessing Success in Comparative Perspective

Measuring Success in the Ecuadorian Legislature

THE ECUADORIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Building a Model of Presidential Success

Constitutional Powers

Partisan Powers

The Electoral Calendar

The Ideological Spectrum

Presidential Popularity

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Constitutional Powers

Partisan Powers

The Time Factor

The Ideological Space for Reforms

Public Opinion Ratings and Anticipated Success

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

4 Party Brokers and Voting Unity in the Ecuadorian Congress

AGENTS OF UNITY: VOTING PATTERNS AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

Party Unity in Comparative Perspective

Government Support in Comparative Perspective

Buying Retail or Wholesale? Party Unity and Government Support in Ecuador

Party Leaders as Agents of Unity

Party Leaders as Brokers of Government Support

PARTY COOPERATION AND POLICY CHANGE

Players’ Preferences and Utility Functions

The Sequence of the Game

TESTING PARTY UNITY PATTERNS IN ECUADOR

Explaining Party Unity Scores

Explaining Party Voting with the President

Searching for Reliable Legislative Partners

Bargaining “On Its Own Merits”

Vote Buying and “The Man With a Suitcase”

The Electoral Calendar and “Ghost Coalitions”

Economic Laws, Impeachments and Congressional Appointments

DISCUSSION: LEGISLATIVE BROKERS VS. FREE AGENTS

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5 Voting at the Margins

EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: THE PIVOTAL PLAYER’S DILEMMA

Individual Motivations to Defect: the Goals of Pivotal Players

Party Dissent, Switching and Transaction Costs

CRAFTING A MEASURE OF CAMISETAZOS

Modeling Defections

Model Predictions and Analysis

ANALYSIS OF PARTY SWITCHING

Party Switching and the Electoral Connection

Party Switching and Political Careers

Party Switching and Political Ideology

Party Switching and Government Majorities

Barriers to Switching: The Code of Ethics

BREAKING THE VOTE: PARTY DISSIDENTS AND GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

Party Dissidents and the Electoral Connection

Party dissidents and political careers

Party Dissidents and Political Ideology

Party Dissidents and Government Majorities

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6 Ghost Coalitions in the Making of Economic Reforms1

CRAFTING COALITIONS FOR REFORM: INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS

THE EMERGENCE OF GHOST COALITIONS IN ECUADOR

Crafting Reforms in an Unlikely Environment

Presidential Popularity, Public Opinion and the Media

EXPLAINING INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS: WHO MAKES THEM AND HOW DO THEY WORK?

The Benefits of Legislative Cooperation

Power-Sharing Arrangements and the Election of Control Authorities

Cabinet Ministries

Patronage Distribution: Provincial Governors and State Companies

Pork and Policy Concessions

Particularistic Benefits

Monitoring and Penalizing Ghost Coalitions

GHOST COALITIONS IN THE MAKING OF REFORMS: TWO CASE STUDIES

The Modernization Reforms (1992–1996)

The Dollarization Reforms (1998–2002)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

7 Ghost Coalitions, Institutional Change and Democratic Accountability

THE GRAY DIMENSIONS OF COALITION FORMATION

GHOST COALITIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

GHOST COALITIONS AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Notes

Bibliography

Index

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Tags: Andrés Mejía Acosta, Informal Coalitions, Latin America Ecuador, Comparative Perspective